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With a few unfortunate exceptions the last three decades have seen reductions in 
inflation around the world to the point that many would argue that further 
improvements in price stability would offer only limited welfare gains. This 
experience is the result of many factors, some of which are country-specific. In 
this paper we seek to isolate one of the factors, namely, the improvement in the 
quality of monetary policy. There are two novel aspects to the study. Firstly, we 
essentially estimate a gravity-like model. Secondly, we propose generally a more 
exhaustive analysis of the potential role of a large number of institutional factors 
than has been done before. Briefly, we find that institutional factors play a role in 
explaining inflation relative to the US experience, which is used as the 
benchmark. Nevertheless, any reduction in inflation stemming from greater 
central bank autonomy is a feature of the 1980s and early 1990s. Thereafter, 
central banks in the OECD look very much alike. 
 
Keywords: globalization, inflation differentials, monetary policy strategy, 
institutional change 
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Selittävätkö inflaation hidastumista rahapolitiikan 
institutionaaliset ominaisuudet vai globalisaation 
jälkivaikutukset? 
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Muutamaa poikkeusta lukuun ottamatta inflaatiovauhti on viimeisten kolmen 
vuosikymmenen aikana hidastunut merkittävästi kaikkialla maailmassa. Onkin 
väitetty, että hintavakauden parantuminen nykyisestä ei enää olennaisesti kohenna 
kansalaisten hyvinvointia. Hintavakauden parantumista voidaan selittää monella 
tekijällä, jotka ovat osin maakohtaisia. Tässä työssä keskitytään nimenomaan 
niihin tekijöihin, joiden ansiosta harjoitettua rahapolitiikkaa on kyetty laadullisesti 
parantamaan. Tämän tutkimuksen lähestymistapaa voidaan pitää uudenlaisena 
kahdesta syystä. Ensinnäkin tutkimuksen empiirisessä osassa estimoidaan 
eräänlainen gravitaatiomalli. Toiseksi työssä analysoidaan tyhjentävämmin kuin 
aiemmissa tutkimuksissa lukuisten institutionaalisten tekijöiden mahdollinen mer-
kitys hintavakauden paranemisen kannalta. Tutkimustulosten mukaan näillä insti-
tutionaalisilla tekijöillä kyetäänkin osittain selittämään eri maiden inflaatio-
vauhdin hidastumista suhteessa Yhdysvaltoihin, jota käytetään tässä työssä 
vertauskohtana. Keskuspankin itsenäisyyden kasvun vaikutus inflaatiovauhdin 
hidastumiseen erottuu kuitenkin selkeimmin 1980-luvulla ja 1990-luvun alussa. 
Jälkeenpäin OECD-alueen keskuspankit näyttävät hyvin samanlaisilta. 
 
Avainsanat: globalisaation, inflaatioerot, rahapolitiikan strategia, institutionaali-
nen muutos 
 
JEL-luokittelu: E42, E58, C33  
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With a few unfortunate exceptions the last three decades has seen reductions in 
inflation around the world to the point that many would argue that further 
improvements in price stability would offer only limited welfare gains. This 
experience is the result of many factors, some of which are country-specific (eg 
see IMF, 2006). In this paper we seek to isolate one of the factors, namely, the 
improvement in the quality of monetary policy. There is very considerable 
consensus at present over what constitutes ‘good’ monetary policy – see 
Woodford (2003) for example – but over that three decade period there has been 
considerable variety in policy just as there has been considerable variation in the 
concomitant inflation rates. As with any such study we have to be able to take 
account of the main range of other factors that could explain the differences in 
performance. We do this with a panel study of 20 OECD countries over the last 30 
years using what is in effect a difference-in-differences estimator so that we can 
draw some conclusions for the role of monetary policy. 
  Not only is there some debate about the role that monetary policy has played 
but there are disagrements about whether particular monetary policy frameworks 
have been more effective than others (eg see Freytag and Schneider, 2007). Over 
much of the period the Swiss and German performance has been best, with 
monetary policy based on the control of monetary aggregates. However, since the 
Volcker years, the United States has also performed well with a somewhat 
pragmatic, some would say, flexible, policy. However, others have outperformed 
the United States, particularly with the rise of inflation targeting, and Switzerland 
and Germany no longer stand out as exceptional. Of course the comparison is 
complicated by the creation of the euro area, where a single monetary policy 
affects the inflation rates of 16 countries, 10 of which are in our sample. 
Additionally, one might wish to extend the range of countries affected to those 
with currency boards or with very tight pegs such as in Denmark. 
  Several papers have recently been written that attempt to document the extent 
to which inflation rates around the world have been driven by global factors (eg a 
partial list includes Borio and Filardo, 2007; Tootell, 1998; Gamber and Hung 
,2001; Bean, 2006; Pain, Kospke, and Sollie, 2006; Tytell and Wei, 2004). In 
particular, there has been keen interest in the role that China’s inflation rate has 
played in driving down inflation rates in various parts of the world (eg see Côté 
and De Resende, 2008). A related literature has documented how the Maastricht 
Treaty, and the requirements of inflation convergence among European Union 
member countries, may also have indirectly contributed to inflation developments 
around the globe (eg see Siklos, 2008, and references therein). There continues to 
be an ongoing debate about the role that the choice of a monetary strategy plays in 
generating a particular inflation outcome. For example, the jury is still out about  
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whether the adoption of explicit inflation targets independently contributes to 
consistently, or even permanently, anchoring inflationary expectations (eg 
Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007). Most would not object to interpreting an 
inflation targeting strategy as one that has succeeded in reducing inflation. The 
controversy is whether this kind of monetary policy works better than others that 
have been tried in the past, and were found wanting, such as a rigid exchange rate 
peg. Finally, there is a lingering view that certain institutional characteristics that 
describe both the relationship between the central bank and government, and the 
manner in which central bank sets the course of monetary policy, should also be a 
significant factor in overall inflation performance (eg Acemoglu et al, 2008). 
After all, the drop in inflation worldwide also took place when central banks both 
became more autonomous, accountable, and transparent (eg Dincer and 
Eichengreen, 2007; van der Cruijsen and Eijffinger, 2008). Needless to say, there 
are skeptics of the notion that there are significant links between central bank 
institutional characteristics and inflation performance (eg Hayo and Hefeker, 
2008). 
  Figure 1.1 plots inflation in the 1990s, as well as inflation since the 1960s for 
different regions of the world. The apparent convergence of inflation rates seems 
clear from the data for the 1990s while a longer run perspective suggests that 
cross-country similarities in inflation rates is not exactly a new phenomenon. We 
have seen this before, although both the institutional and policy environments of 
the 1960s versus the 1990s are, of course, markedly different. 
  This paper is firmly in the camp of studies relying on a fairly large cross-
section of countries over the past decade and a half that asks: to what extent are 
institutional or global factors, whether of the economic or political varieties (eg 
see Eichengreen and Leblang, 2006), responsible for the fall in global inflation? 
However, unlike other studies (eg Borio and Filardo, 2007) we eschew reliance on 
a global measure of the slack in output, in part because this proxy has proved 
somewhat controversial (eg see Ihrig et al, 2007). Instead we consider a measure 
of economic distance, originally proposed by Alesina and Grilli (1992) which, 
given the difficulties inherent in proxying global factors in the first place, seems 
both an intuitively plausible and tractable way of capturing international 
influences on inflation in a cross-sectional model of the kind used here. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we briefly survey some of 
the approaches that have been taken to address the impact of globalization on 
inflation performance. Next, we outline the methodology used to estimate our 
version of the determinants, institutional or otherwise, of inflation in a cross-
sectional framework. Then, we turn to a description of the data and a discussion of 
some stylized facts, prior to presenting the empirical results. The paper concludes 
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  Briefly, we find that institutional factors play a role in explaining inflation 
relative to the US experience, which is used as the benchmark. Nevertheless, any 
reduction in inflation stemming from greater central bank autonomy is a feature of 
the 1980s and early 1990s. Thereafter, central banks in the OECD look very much 
alike. For this reason, the ongoing financial crisis will provide in future not only a 
means of testing the robustness of our results but may well permit researchers to 
sort out the question whether some monetary policy strategies are better than 
others. In particular, we may well be able to answer more definitively whether, as 
Mishkin (2009) argues, ‘…increased commitment to stabilizing inflation [is] the 
right thing to do when we are in the throes of a financial crisis…’. 
 
 
2 Background  literature 
There exist a variety of approaches taken to explore the connection between 
inflation and its global determinants. Some estimate a Phillips curve, or some 
version of it, and ask whether the trade-off has weakened in recent years. Various 
reasons are given such as general improvements in the conduct of monetary policy 
or perhaps due to the so-called Great Moderation (Bernanke, 2004) which began 
during the mid 1980s, interpreted as a reduction in both the frequency and size of 
economic shocks (eg Ball and Sheridan, 2005; Borio and Filardo, 2007). 
  Alternatively, the suggestion is that global factors, especially during the 
second half of the 1990s and early in the 21st century, have contributed 
significantly to explaining cross-country inflation performance. Nevertheless, the 
evidence concerning the role of globalization is not yet conclusive. Disagreements 
about the relative importance of global factors stem partly from the manner in 
which the aggregate supply curve is empirically specified, namely the extent to 
which backward versus forward-looking elements in the trade-off are allowed to 
determine current inflation. Perhaps more importantly, there have been concerns 
expressed over the measurement and reliability of global measures of output 
slack. For example, Borio and Filardo (2007) estimate a weighted average of 
international output gaps, where the latter are approximated via H-P filtering 
(other filters are also considered) and find that these help us understand the 
determination of inflation. Ihrig et al (2007) report that how the global output gap 
measure is estimated matters and that Borio and Filardo’s results are not robust. 
  A different approach has been to determine empirically the extent to which 
inflation from China, whose economic importance has grown considerably in 
recent years, has been imported. This development has taken place at the same 
time as views about the extent to which pass-through effects from exchange rate 
changes to inflation have moderated considerably in recent years as inflation 
expectations have become better anchored (eg Balliu and Fujii, 2004; Campa,  
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Goldberg and Gonzalez-Minguez, 2007). The role of pass-through effects is not 
entirely divorced from an earlier literature, starting with Romer (1993), who 
reports  a negative correlation between inflation and the degree of economic 
openness.
1 Accordingly, as globalization has grown in influence so have 
economies become more open with the implication that they have become less 
inflation prone. Also contributing to this outcome has been the relaxation in 
capital controls (eg see Edwards, 2007). 
  Another literature examines whether the international environment has 
become more competitive, again in no small part due to the rise of China and the 
remaining BRIC countries (viz., China, Brazil, Russia, and India), thereby driving 
down inflation on a global scale (eg see Guerrieri, Gust, Lopez-Salido, 2008). 
  Finally, an altogether different approach tries to find some common features 
in the data. These may emerge as a form of convergence in inflation across 
various parts of the world, which can be approximated according to whether 
inflation differentials between pairs of countries are stationary. The more 
cointegration that is found between inflation rates the fewer common trends there 
are. Siklos and Wohar (1997) show that, in a sample of N countries, convergence 
requires not only that there must be N-1 cointegrating vectors but that they must 
be of the (1, -1) form. Alternatively, as in Busetti et al (2007), the simple inflation 
differential must be stationary. Clearly, if there is a global connection that drives 
inflation rates to be attracted to each other, this can imply that inflation rates are 
cointegrated. Unfortunately, this approach is not directly informative about the 
source of the cointegration, namely whether it stems from institutional factors, the 
monetary policy strategy that is followed, or other factors?
2 
  Indeed, this kind of strategy has been indirectly criticized because the so-
called convergence in inflation is simply thought to represent a regression to the 
mean. Ball and Sheridan (2005) contend that the superior inflation performance of 
an inflation targeting regime, a policy choice that involves considerable 
institutional transformation (eg see Bernanke et al, 1999), is merely a statistical 
artifact (Ball, 2006). They estimate a regression of the form 
 
it 1 it 1 0 1 it it ε + π β + β = π − π − −  (2.1) 
 
where  it π  is average inflation in country i over period t, or regime, while  1 it− π  
represents average inflation in an earlier ‘period’, or regime. The regime in 
question is, of course, inflation targeting and whatever other regime preceded it. 
                                                 
1 Measured as the sum of exports and imports to GDP. While openness and other phenomena 
associated with what is commonly referred to as globalization may have exerted an impact on 
inflationary developments, Woodford (2007) finds it difficult to square this result with the notion 
of an increased difficulty for central banks to set their own course for inflation. 
2 Stock and Watson (2003) ascribe to ‘luck’ a significant portion of macroeconomic performance 
during the Great Moderation.  
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An estimate of the parameter β1 is an empirical indication of the size and 
statistical significance of a ‘regime shift’. 
  While Ball and Sheridan present evidence suggesting that inflation targeting 
did not represent an improvement (also see Dueker and Fischer, 2006), there have 
also been several critics of the approach implicit in (2.1), including Vega and 
Winkelried (2005), and Ragan (2005), who point out, among other faults with the 
Ball and Sheridan approach, that the results can be sensitive to the choice of the 
sample period chosen to compare one regime with an earlier one, and that the 
specification relies exclusively realized inflation. Inflation targeting is perhaps 
most distinctive in its attempt to anchor inflationary expectations directly.
3 
Moreover, there is insufficient scope given to the subtle but important differences 
that exist concerning the idiosyncratic features of different inflation targeting 
regimes. In addition, there is too little recognition of the fact that inflation 
targeting has outlasted the obvious alternative ‘global’ monetary policy strategy, 
namely Bretton Woods (eg see Rose, 2007; Siklos, 2008a). Moreover, the Ball 
and Sheridan test does not make allowances for the notion that the choice of the 
regime is possibly endogenous. Hence, countries may have chosen inflation 
targeting because of a poor earlier historical record with inflation although some 
(eg Lin and Ye, 2007) contend that, as a result, the adoption of inflation targeting 
amounts to a form of ‘window dressing’. Therefore, this kind of regime cannot 
independently explain the successful reduction in inflation. However, the 
transparency normally entailed by inflation targeting makes it rather difficult for 
the policy to be simply window dressing – one of the sources of its success is that 
the authorities have to make a visible commitment for the policy to be credible. 
Moreover, the test of accountability for an inflation targeting regime is more 
demanding than for competing monetary policy strategies. Notably, the central 
bank is more autonomous but, in the bargain, must publicly explain itself if the 
agreed to inflation control ranges are violated. 
  Finally, the Ball and Sheridan approach essentially amounts to treating 
inflation targeting as a ‘straw man’ thereby setting up the test for failure of the 
regime while ignoring other forces that may impinge on inflation performance, 
especially the role of ‘globalization’. This is the view taken by, among others, 
Rogoff (2003) who argues that global factors, difficult as they may be to measure, 
lie behind a significant portion of the reduction in inflation worldwide in recent 
years. Performance under inflation targeting somehow needs to be compared with 
how performance might have been under an alternative, and perceived to be, good 
monetary policy. 
  Another global factor, emphasized in the literature that addresses the 
consequences of institutional arrangements more explicitly, concerns the impact 
                                                 
3 Other monetary policy frameworks also try to anchor expectations. A currency board for example 
tries to relate them to inflation in country of the backing currency.  
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of central bank independence (CBI). To say that the evidence in favor of central 
bank independence reducing inflation is mixed is an understatement. Supporters 
of a connection between CBI and levels of inflation abound (eg Cukierman, 1992; 
Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini, 1991; Eijffinger and de Haan, 1996; Siklos, 
2002) but a number of valid concerns and objections about how de jure forms of 
CBI are constructed have also been leveled at this literature (eg Banaian, 
Burdekin and Willett, 1998; Mangano, 1998).
4 
  Just as criticisms of the inflation strategy have emerged, there have been 
similar doubts raise about the resort to monetary aggregates to control inflation 
(Bernanke and Mishkin, 1992), in spite of the prominent role of this kind of 
indicator as one of the pillars in the monetary policy strategy of the European 
Central Bank (ECB). 
  Finally, exchange rate regime choice considerations have often loomed large 
in the literature that considers the driving forces behind inflation performance (eg 
see Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004). In a related fashion, crises of the financial variety 
may also, perhaps indirectly, contribute to inflation performance. Attempting to 
take account of this possibility also raises a number of thorny econometric issues 
which are highlighted in the following section.
5 
  Neglected in all the foregoing arguments is that the mere declaration of a 
desire for lower inflation, or inheriting a lower inflation from abroad, does not 
take place in a vacuum. Institutions, and how they adapt to changing domestic and 
international circumstances, may also have had a role in changes in inflation 
performance worldwide. It is with this in mind that the methodological approach 
followed in this paper, while not entirely dissimilar to the Ball and Sheridan 
approach, is substantively different in emphasis, as is shown below. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Concerns about the subjectivity of de jure measures of CBI led some authors to resort to proxies 
for de facto forms of CBI, such as turnover rates of central bank governors. 
5 In the sample of countries considered below, virtually none of them suffered either a banking or a 
currency crisis. The only exceptions are: Finland (1991–1993), Japan (1997), Norway (1991), and 
Sweden (1991, 1993). In contrast, hardly a year has gone by during the 1990–2006 period 
examined when one or several countries did not experience a banking or a currency crisis. It is, 
therefore, unlikely that directly accounting for crises will be fruitful. For a compendium of crisis 
events, see Laeven and Valencia (2008).  
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3 Methodological  considerations 
This section has two parts. In the first we consider how the model and the 
variables within it can be specified. In the second we explore the nature of the 
data available and the problems they pose for estimation. 
 
 
3.1 Estimation  strategy 
This paper proposes to explain the determinants of inflation convergence among 
industrial countries and the role played institutional factors. Quarterly data from 
20 OECD countries, for the most part since 1990, are used in a panel setting.
6 
There are two novel aspects to the study. First, we essentially estimate a gravity 
like model. Second, we propose generally a more exhaustive analysis of the 
potential role of a large number of institutional factors than has heretofore been 
done. 
  One can view the proposed specification as akin to a differences-in-
differences estimator. Hence, if we treat a particular country as having followed 
the most desirable monetary policies, on average, then the tests below emphasize 
the attraction, or pull, of that particular benchmark country in influencing the 
others’ inflation. We have used the US as our main focus, to quite some extent 
because it followed the typical route of letting inflation get out of control, 
recognizing the problem and putting in place a strategy to establish price 
stability.
7 All countries in the sample had more or less flexible exchange rates vis-
à-vis the US.
8 This transforms the problem into one that asks: what determines the 
differential in country pair’s inflation rates. The basic specification can thus be 
written as follows 
 
ijt ijt ij t 0 ijt Z ' ln ε + β + α + α + α = π  (3.1) 
                                                 
6 It is natural to want to consider as large as possible a panel to investigate the issues under study. 
However, if one takes seriously the results and Acemoglu et al (2008) – and the comments on this 
study were rather critical – then institutional factors matter a great deal more when there are 
significant constraints on the political principals. There are, in addition, as will become clearer in 
the discussion below, data availability constraints. All the countries in our data set, save Portugal 
and Spain, are ones with high constraints on the executive. See the appendix in Acemoglu et al 
(2008). 
7 An alternative benchmark could be the euro area. Indeed, the tests below were also repeated for 
this case and the conclusions are largely the same. One difficulty with this alternative benchmark 
is that the euro area has only formally existed since 1999, although pseudo-data can be generated 
as far back as the 1980s. While there may be other benchmarks one could consider it is difficult to 
conceive of better ones than either the US or the euro area. 
8 According to Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002).  
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where πijt is the inflation differential between country i and j,
9 and α are three 
constants, the first common to all country pairs and years, the second specific to 
year t, and the third specific to country pairs but constant through time (eg these 
would include country and region dummies). Zijt is a vector of ‘gravity’ variables. 
Following the usual convention in the literature βijt = β' (though these are testable 
hypothesis, of course). Cheng and Wall (2005) give an overview of specifications 
such as equation (3.1) and suggest that a model which includes country fixed pairs 
effects performs best in statistical terms. Note that one test of convergence, 
namely the unit root or cointegration version of the test for convergence, would 
set αt = αij = β'Zijt = 0 thereby concluding that inflation differentials are stationary. 
One of many tests for panel unit roots can also be used to confirm or reject this 
hypothesis. 
  Critical to (3.1) is the definition of Zijt. Relying on the arguments made above 
these consist of measures of central bank autonomy, transparency and 
accountability, qualitative measures of governance, the type of exchange rate 
regime or monetary policy strategy in place, a measure of economic distance 
suggested by Alesina and Grilli (1992), and a measure of relative ‘stress’ in 
monetary policy as a proxy for ‘distance’ in the stance of monetary policy. 
Qualitative indicators of transparency from Siklos (2002, Chapter 6, 2008) were 
also employed. An alternative measure of transparency is from Dincer and 
Eichengreen (2007) which was also applied to the data. These include the type of 
central bank information that is released (eg whether there is an inflation report, 
whether staff forecast are publicly available, whether fixed dates are made for 
interest rate announcements, and so on). Governance variables are constructed 
from Siklos (2002, 2008). They capture the size and type of committee structure, 
the frequency of meetings, whether committee votes are publicly made, whether 
committee decision-making is sanctioned by legislation or not. There is a growing 
body of evidence that associates the emphasis on greater transparency and 
accountability in central banking with better inflation performance (eg see 
Eijffinger and Geraats, 2006). Exchange rate regimes and monetary policy 
strategy classifications are from Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) and 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). 
  While measures of central bank autonomy, such as the seminal ones created 
by Cukierman (1992) and since used by many authors (see Siklos, 2008b, and 
references therein), have been criticized for valid reasons (eg see Acemoglu et al, 
2008; Banaian, Burdekin, and Willett, 1998), they contain a grain of truth about 
what explains inflation rates (also see Polillo and Guillén, 2005) and, possibly 
more importantly, inflation differentials. Finally, recent improvements are 
refinements in the measurement of political and economic independence of central 
                                                 
9 Following Cukierman (1992), we define ln(1+%ΔP/100), where %ΔP is the percent change in 
consumer prices, to represent inflation.  
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banks (Arnone, Laurens, Segolatto, and Sommer, 2007), building upon the 
original work by Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991), seem to be associated 
with changes in inflation performance, at least for several regions of the world 
(Arnone, Laurens, Segolatto, Sommer, 2007). 
  Economic distance refers to an indicator of divergence in output performance 
defined as the ratio of standard deviations adjusted for the correlation in output 
growth between two countries based on a four year moving average. Since 
Alesina and Grilli (1992) introduce this measure as a short-hand way of 
evaluating the likely costs of monetary union this is a natural variable to use in the 
present context to represent some of the economic forces contributing to inflation 
convergence. Presumably, the smaller are the differences in output performance 
between pairs of countries the smaller the costs of inflation convergence. More 
precisely, the Alesina and Grilli (1992) statistic is evaluated as 
 
2 / 1 2
ij
2
j i ) ) 1 ( ) / (( ρ + + σ σ  (3.2) 
 
where σ is the standard deviation of output growth in countries i and j, and ρij is 
the simple correlation in output growth between countries i and j. Expression (3.2) 
makes it clear that economic distance is a function of the variation in output 
growth (or inflation) in one country relative to some benchmark, as well as how 
closely income (or inflation) are correlated between these same pairs of countries. 
As output growth volatility in country i rises over time relative to that of the US, 
this will also likely reduce the correlation between the growth rate of the i,j 
country pair. Consequently, economic distance will rise and this reflects 
divergences in economic performance between pairs of countries. The data reveal 
(not shown, but see the Appendix) that there has been considerable variation in 
economic distance over the decade of the 1990s and, while cross-country 
differences persist, differences have narrowed since the early 1990s. 
  Contrary to the belief held by some that economic growth in the US was 
becoming decoupled from the rest of the world the evidence suggests, at least for 
many of the OECD economies in our sample, that growth correlations have 
actually risen over time. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that there is a 
discrepancy between those economies that chose an inflation targeting strategy, 
who have generally seen their growth correlations with the US falling, and other  
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non-inflation targeting countries.
10 Interested readers can examine the relevant 
plots in an appendix (not shown).
11 
  The measure of ‘distance’ in the stance of monetary policy is simply the 
difference between country pairs ij in a measure of ‘stress’ introduced by Clarida, 
Gali, and Gertler (1998) that is meant to ‘…gauge how different interest rates 
might be but for a binding commitment to an exchange rate arrangement, 
monetary union, or currency board.’ The proposed stress indicator for each 
country i is evaluated as the difference between the central bank’s interest rate 
instrument and the rate predicted by an interest rate rule. 
 
( ) ( ) t jt t n t j t , i i z E E i STRESS Ω γ − Ω π β − = +  (3.3) 
 
where i is the central bank interest rate instrument, π is inflation, and z are other 
variables in the central bank’s reaction function (usually the output gap, but in 
open economies the real exchange rate too). STRESSij is then the differential in 
stress measures between pairs of countries i and j. The larger the value of the 
STRESS variable, the greater the ‘distance’ in the monetary policy stance between 
countries i and j. the weights β and γ reflect the central bank’s preferences for 
inflation versus output gap control. For reasons explained below, instead of 
estimating these coefficients we impose values that are thought to capture how the 




3.2  Data and stylized facts 
Annual data since at least 1990 are used to estimate a version of equation (3.1). 
The data are essentially either quantitative (eg inflation, output, output gap) or 
qualitative (eg central bank autonomy, transparency, etc…) represented by 
categorical variables. More detailed sources are provided in the appendix, as well 
as the mnemonics for the variables used and the country codes. 
 
 
                                                 
10 To be fair, the decoupling view was primarily associated either with the evolution of economic 
growth between emerging markets and the US, and not necessarily between OECD economies and 
the US Siklos (2008) shows that the decoupling hypothesis does not hold even when emerging 
market economies are considered. However, there has been a reduction in growth correlations 
between economies that have adopted inflation targeting and the US that is noticeably stronger 
than among economies that do not target inflation and US economic growth. These same 
correlations were not generated for the euro area and the economies in our sample since half the 
countries in this study eventually adopted the euro. 
11 It is also noteworthy that correlations can be interrupted by crisis (eg the 1992 ERM crisis).  
18 
3.2.1 Inflation 
Figure 3.1 plot the inflation differentials vis-á-vis the US during the 1990s while 
the same plot showing the differential during the decade of the 1980s is shown in 
Figure 3.2. By the 1990s US inflation is not much different than inflation in 
almost all of the OECD countries considered in this study. The results are not 
substantially different when the benchmark is the euro area, again for data since 
the 1990s. Note that some countries (eg Portugal, Sweden, even the UK) have 
experienced larger disinflations relative to the US than many other countries. 
Indeed, by the end of the 1990s, inflation differentials become small, often below 
1%. In contrast, the 1980s (Figure 3.2) sees US inflation as substantially lower 
than it is elsewhere in the OECD. Moreover, the order of magnitude of the 
inflation differentials during the 1980s is many times higher than in the 1990s, 
and thereafter. The change in cross-country inflation performance is nothing short 
of dramatic. One of the only exceptions is Japan which returns consistently lower 
inflation than in the US. 
  Is the comparison between the 1980s and 1990s and beyond the correct one? 
To the extent that the last two decades or so have seen the introduction of major 
changes in the relationship between central bank and their governments, on the 
one hand, and the public, on the other, as well as the absence of major aggregate 
supply shocks, the answer is yes. Table 3.1 presents decanal data on mean 
inflation differentials between the US and the remaining OECD economies in our 
sample since 1960. Whereas relatively few countries had inflation rates that were, 
on average, lower than in the US during the 1960s (only 1 country), or the 1970s 
(4 countries), the situation changes rapidly thereafter with 6 countries during the 
1980s and 15 countries displaying inflation performance superior to that in the 
US.
12 Moreover, a stylized fact often ignored, is the substantial drop in inflation 
volatility, with the most notable drop occurring beginning during the 1990s. 




                                                 
12 Not all the differentials are, of course, statistically significant.  Blanchard and Simon (2001) 
drew attention to the drop in volatility of inflation and real economic growth that has since come 
to be called the Great Moderation. 
13 There are other ways to bring in a role for volatility but these will not be considered here any 
further. The components of economic distance were previously described. A plot of economic 
distance is relegated to an appendix. it is interesting to note that while economic distance has 
diminished between the US and the other OECD economies in our data, the same is not 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.2.2  A measure of the perceived success monetary policy 
framework: inflation expectations 
A measure of the success of institutional reforms, or the adoption of an alternative 
monetary policy strategy, is how credible these attempts are. An obvious means of 
assessing the credibility effects is to examine a proxy for inflation expectations. 
Unfortunately, comparable to data going back decades is difficult to collect. 
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 plot forecast errors from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook 
since 1980 and, depending upon availability, forecast errors based on the poll of 
Forecasters in The Economist or the Consensus Forecasts 
(www.consensuseconomics.com). A band around these forecasts of ±0.5% is also 
shown. Admittedly, the size of the band is somewhat arbitrary but such a band 
translates, after 10 years, into a cumulative error of approximately 5%. This is 
judged to be sufficiently large so that failure to remain within this band over an 
extended period of time is likely to reduce the credibility of any regime. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the methodology used to generate these forecast can 
differ by source, we find that whereas forecast errors were large during the 1980s 
the tolerance band is clearly much more visible when data since the 1990s only 
are examined. Again, this is suggestive of a shift in the behavior and performance 
of inflation between the two decades. Perhaps just as interesting is that when the 
data over the past two decades are examined, as summarized in Figures 3.1 
through 3.4, and in Table 3.1, there is considerable diversity in the inflationary 
experience, even among the relatively small group of 20 OECD economies. 
 
 
3.2.3  Measuring the stance of monetary policy 
There are also differences in how monetary policies are carried out. One question 
is how best to proxy the stance of monetary policy in such a cross-sectional 
setting for over 2 decades worth of data. Two alternatives are considered. While it 
is standard practice to assume nowadays that an interest rate instrument is used to 
depict how central banks set the stance of monetary policy this was not always so. 
Indeed, when contrasting the conduct of monetary policy over two decades or 
more of data, it is less likely that an interest rate instrument will be suitable to 
determine how central banks implemented policy. Some central banks (viz., the 
ECB, and the Bank of Canada; see Armour, Atta-Mensah, Engert, and Hendry, 
1996; Roffia and Zaghini, 2007) have, for some time, shown that the money gap 
is a useful predictor of inflation. Essentially, this amounts to finding the difference 
between a narrow monetary aggregate (eg M1) and the level of money predicted 
by a long-run cointegrating relationship that defines money demand. This means 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































t 3 t 2 t 1 0 t T i y m ε + α + α + α + α =  (3.4) 
 
where m is the logarithm of the chosen money supply measure, y is the logarithm 
of real GDP, i is a short-term interest rate, and T is a time trend which may or may 
not be necessary as a proxy for the effect of financial innovations, an unobserved 
variable (at least until perhaps well after the fact). If the estimates reveal that there 
is some cointegration present in the data then a linear combination of some of the 
variables is stationary. Quite often, for a variety of countries, received empirical 
evidence reveals a single cointegrating vector. In that case, εt is stationary. The 
money gap then is simply the error correction term found by lagging the error 
term in equation (3.4) one period. The appendix to the paper (not shown) plots 
estimates of the money gap for each country in the data set.
14 
  If we now consider the measurement of the stance or stress of monetary 
policy (see equation (3.3)) based on a Taylor rule approximation we also face a 
few difficulties. One approach might be to estimate some forward-looking rule 
that appears to best fit each country’s interest rate behavior. Of course, during the 
period under study it is likely that the exchange rate played a greater or lesser role 
over time in setting interest rates (eg see Taylor, 2007, 2008). Moreover, 
estimation of such a rule requires a fair amount of data and one also has to be 
mindful of the choice of instruments when estimating these rules as it an have an 
important influence on the results (eg Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1998; Siklos and 
Bohl, 2008). Given that a version of Taylor’s original formulation seems to 
capture reasonably well the rule a central bank would have followed, on average, 
we follow Poole’s (2006) approach and rely on the following definition of the 
instrument rule, that is 
 
1 t , i y ~ i 1 t , i i i it y ~ 100 *) ( i ˆ
− − π γ ⋅ + π − π γ + ρ =  (3.5) 
 
where  πt–1 is last period’s inflation rate, π* is a target for inflation, y ~  is an 
estimate of the output gap, while  y ~ , γ γπ , respectively, represent the weights the 
central bank attach to inflation rates that depart from the target and the output 
gap., and ρ is the sum of the target rate of inflation and an estimate of the 
‘equilibrium’ or ‘natural’ real interest rate. All coefficients are estimated for 
country i. We follow Poole in assuming that π = 2%, the equilibrium real interest 
rate is 1.5%, so that ρ = 3.5%, γπ = 1.5 to satisfy the Taylor principle, while two 
alternative values for the output gap weight are considered, namely  8 . 0 , 5 . 0 y ~ = γ .
15 
                                                 
14 Estimates of cointegrating relationships are not shown but are available on request. 
15 Poole (2006) considers two alternatives for the weight on the output gap because the smaller 
weight fits the data better, but results in interest rates that are too smooth while the correct amount 
of volatility in US interest rates is obtained by increasing  y ~ γ .  
26 
Consequently, an indication that the stance of monetary policy is tight implies that 
the difference between the predicted interest rate according to the Taylor rule and 
the actual policy rate is positive while loose policies would result in a negative 
value in the expression 
 
it it it i ˆ i STRESS − =  (3.6) 
 
Since the construction of the forecast errors and economic distance variables were 
described above, additional discussion is not necessary. Central bank 
independence is defined by relying on several proxies, also previously discussed. 
Ordinarily defined as indices that range from zero to one they are, in the main, 
qualitative indicators of the degree of autonomy from undue political pressure that 
the monetary authority enjoys. The higher the value of the index the more 
independent the central bank is. Finally, it is also plausible that some of the 
determinants of inflation considered in this study will interact with each other. 
However, to prevent us from estimating an over-parameterized specification, only 
the interaction between the stance of monetary policy and proxies for central bank 
independence is considered. Since a great deal of the controversy over the impact 
of policies and institutions on inflation has revolved around the influence of 
central bank autonomy, and how the monetary authority actually implements 
policy, the implied interaction seems to us a natural one to consider. 
 
 
4 Empirical  results 
Table 4.1 presents a series of panel unit root test results. These consistently show 
that the null of a unit root in the inflation differential cannot be rejected regardless 
of the sample or the test employed. Hence, it is unlikely that the results to be 
discussed below are an artifact of the non-stationarity of the dependent variable in 
question. The remaining variables are stationary by construction or were found to 
be so using similar testing procedures (not shown). While the tests employed are 
fairly general there have been a number of recent developments in panel unit root 
testing that could conceivably overturn the results shown in Table 4.1. However, 
tests for a subset of the panel used in Table 4.1 (not shown but also see Siklos, 
2008) suggest that the findings of the stationarity in the inflation differential in the 
chosen panel of countries is robust to other assumptions about the degree of 
heterogeneity and other cross-country variations that could affect the panel unit 
root test statistics. 
  
27 
Table 4.1  Panel unit root test: differential vis-à-vis US 
     inflation 
 
Panels  1980–2006 1980–1998 1990–2006 1999–2006 
All countries: LLC  -4.29 (.00)  -5.37 (.00)  -5.64 (.00)  NA 
IPS  -6.10 (.00)  -5.35 (.00)  -5.70 (.00)  NA 
EA & Non-EA countries: LLC  NA  NA  -4.42 (.00)  -7.01 (.00) 
IPS  NA  NA  -4.25 (.00)  -2.62 (.00) 
Note: All countries is the panel of countries listed in the appendix. EA & Non-EA 
countries are the euro area and the remaining countries in the sample that are not euro 
area members. Data are annual. NA means not applicable. LLC is the Levin, Lin, and 
Chu panel unit root test, IPS is the Im, Pesaran, and Shin panel unit root test. The LLC 
assumes a common unit root, while the IPS test is based on individual unit root behavior. 
In both cases then null is the unit root. The panels are not balanced. 
 
 
Next, we turn to the benchmark OLS fixed effects panel. The results are provided 
in Table 4.2. Both country-specific and time-specific fixed effects cannot be 
rejected.
16 It is immediately clear that estimates are highly sensitive to sample 
choice. In particular, estimation over the full 1980–2006 period suggests that only 
economic distance has a somewhat weak impact on the inflation differential vis-à-
vis the US with a rise in the former leading to an increase in the latter, as would 
be expected. Nevertheless, on closer inspection, one sees that the full sample 
masks a notable change in inflation dynamics between the 1980–1998 and 1999–
2006 periods.
17 The earlier period reveals that a combination of the stance of 
monetary policy and the impact of accumulated forecast errors significantly 
influenced cross-country inflation differentials against the US. Presumably, worse 
than expected domestic inflation forecast performance over time, a proxy for past 
central bank performance, led to an improvement in actual relative inflation 
performance. Of course, we are unable to identify the extent to which this 
outcome can be explained by the reaction of the monetary authorities to this 
indicator of their performance but it does appear that the statistical insignificance 
of the other control variables, notably the stance of monetary policy and central 
bank autonomy, cannot explain inflation differentials in the 1980–1998 period. 
However, matters change when we examine the 1990–2006 sample since both the 
stance of monetary policy and the interaction of the stance of monetary policy and 
central bank autonomy contribute to explaining inflation relative to the US. More 
precisely, when nominal interest rates are higher than necessary, according to the
                                                 
16 Only the joint test of country and time-specific fixed effects is shown. However, separate testing 
does not change any of the conclusions. Both types of fixed effects, where relevant, were found to 
be necessary. 
17 Since it is not immediately clear when to date the effective start of European Monetary Union 
we also consider a separate sub-sample beginning in 1995 (see Mayes and Virén, 2005). Our 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































hypothesized Taylor rule (columns (4)), the predictable relative tightening of 
policy reduces the inflation differential. In the case where the stance of policy is 
proxied by a money gap, a rise increases the differential. This is to be expected 
since a positive money gap indicates a loosening of monetary policy and, hence, is 
expected to be relatively inflationary. Interestingly, the signs on the interaction 
coefficient can be interpreted as suggesting that the combination of a tighter 
(looser) monetary policy stance and greater central bank autonomy permits a 
slightly higher (lower) inflation differential. This could be considered as a little bit 
of evidence that there is a credibility bonus from the awarding of central bank 
independence or the provision of greater central bank transparency. 
  Finally, when we examine the most recent sample (1999–2006) only 
economic distance has a statistically significant impact on the inflation 
differential. It is conceivable that the bonus provided by institutional factors as 
well as the achievement of low and stable inflation in the panel of countries 
considered removed a significant role for the other factors considered. 
  As previously discussed, there is a sense in which the relationship between the 
inflation differential and the various determinants considered is endogenous. 
Consequently, Table 4.3 presents estimates of a panel based on GMM estimation 
where, in addition to the usual selection of lags as variables as instruments a 
variety of other variables that are expected to be correlated with the inflation 
differential but uncorrelated with the endogenous variables are added. These 
include a variety of governance indicators created by the World Bank as well as 
exchange rate and inflation targeting dummy indicators (see notes to Table 4.3). 
Not surprisingly, the change of estimation strategy influences the results. There 
are three notable differences between the results in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. First, 
economic distance vis-à-vis the US is no longer a reliable explanatory variable for 
relative inflation rates, regardless of the sample period considered. Second, the 
cumulative impact of inflation forecast errors have a much larger impact in the 
1980–1998 sample than when OLS is used. Third, various proxies for central bank 
autonomy and transparency are more robustly related to the inflation differential 
when allowance is made for the endogeneity of the relationship between the two 
indicators. Perhaps most interesting of all is that while the central bank 
institutional indicator has a large negative impact on the US inflation differential 
in the early sample (1980–1998) the sign for this variable turns positive in the post 
1990 period. The interaction with the stance of monetary policy offsets this 
reaction somewhat but does not eliminate it entirely. While the results are 
somewhat sensitive to the choice of different central bank indicators another 
interpretation is simply that, after an initial beneficial impact on inflation, the link 
between the inflation differential and central bank autonomy need not be 
permanently negative, a result that others have reported, as previously discussed. 
Finally, it is worth briefly commenting on the country-specific intercept terms. It 
is interesting that while these are almost always statistically significant for the full  
32 
sample, suggesting a positive inflation differential exists against US inflation, 
these same intercepts become largely insignificant, or becoming negative and 
significant, especially in the post 1999 period. This outcome simply captures 
statistically the earlier noted stylized fact, namely the dramatic convergence in 





This paper has considered whether various determinants of the quality of 
monetary policy introduced in 20 OECD countries since the 1980s has 
significantly affected inflation vis-à-vis the US. The US is chosen as the 
benchmark not only for practical reasons but also because its monetary policy 
over period considered (1980–2006) is often viewed as having set the standard for 
other central banks.
18 In spite of the problems that arise when panels are estimated 
with fixed effects – these have the tendency to render it difficult to find any 
meaningful influences from other determinants of inflation (eg see Rose, Fatas, 
and Mihov, 2005) – this study finds that institutional factors have played a role in 
influencing inflation performance relative to the US experience. Nevertheless, the 
impact is a more nuanced one than previously imagined with the bonus created by 
the introduction of institutional reforms such as greater central bank autonomy or 
transparency a feature of the 1980s and early 1990s. By the late 1990s it becomes 
much more difficult to discriminate between the inflation performance of the US 
and its OECD counterparts. 
  Owing to the selection of countries, samples, estimation techniques employed, 
not to mention the various institutional and non-institutional proxies used to 
measure the quality of monetary policy over time, ours is not the last word on the 
subject. In particular, there is a need to examine more carefully relative inflation 
performance since the late 1990s to understand better whether a form of 
globalization, or some other determinant, can explain the notable convergence in 
inflation performance across countries. Moreover, considering the non-linearity in 
the dynamics of inflation differentials over time, a characteristic of interest rate 
differentials over the same period, may also prove to be a useful avenue to follow 
in future research. Finally, notwithstanding the considerable limitations on data 
availability, expanding the panel of countries to include emerging market 
                                                 
18 US policy can be regarded as a standard for correcting the problem of high inflation and then 
keeping it under control. German (or Swiss) policy on the other hand could be regarded as a 
standard for inflation control over the period as a whole. The creation of the euro area makes 
Germany a more difficult standard to follow over our data period. However, as pointed out 
previously, subject to sample limitations, the results generally hold when the ECB is used as the 
benchmark.  
33 
economies, among others, may also yield important insights into the evolution of 
inflation and its connection with the implementation of monetary policy. Needless 
to say, these all represent fruitful avenues for future research. 
  Over the last two years there has been a burst of inflation world-wide and a 
financial crisis leading to a strong economic downturn. This, in turn, will provide 
new data for a more robust test of the model specified in this study. In a sense any 
reasonable monetary policy will be able to cope in a period when there is 
relatively limited stress. The challenges of this more stressful period may well 
show that some of the characteristics of specific monetary policies perform 
differently from others. There has, for example, been a clear difference in stance 
thus far between the US and the euro area. Interestingly, with the possible 
exception of the UK, differences in policy stances between the inflation targeting 
economies and the US have also emerged but somewhat less between exchange 
rate targeting small open economies and our chosen benchmark. 
  The extent to which the present downturn is indeed a global one will provide 
yet another form of globalization that will require empirical scrutiny in future.  
34 
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Series Name  Symbol 
   
A) Quantitative   
Price level (CPI), 2000=100  CPI 
Real GDP, 2000=100  RGDP 
Real exchange rate, CPI based, 2000=100  RER 
Nominal exchange rate, DCU/US  NER 
Nominal short-term interest rate, %  R 
Nominal long-term interest rate, %  RL 
Monetary Aggregate in DCU  M 
Foreign exchange reserves, millions US$  RES 
WEO inflation forecasts, %  WEO 
Consensus/Economist forecasts, %  INFC1 
Commodity Prices (oil, food, non-fuel)  PCOM 
Economic distance  ECONDIST 
Population, millions  POP 
   
B) Qualitative   
Exchange rate regime type  ERR 
Central bank governors’ terms  GOV 
Central Bank independence index  CBI 
Political stability index  PS 
Voice and accountability index  VA 
Central bank accountability  ACC 
Central Bank transparency  DIS 
Index of economic freedom  FREE 
Index of monetary freedom  MFREE 
   
C) Country Codes   













New Zealand   NZ  
Norway NO 
Portugal PT 
Spain   SP  
Sweden SE 
Switzerland SW 
United Kingdom  UK 
United States  US 
Note: Data sources are provided in the text. Additional data sources include World Bank (2006), 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A3  Pair-wise correlations in real GDP growth 
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Note: Country codes are defined in the Appendix.  
46 
Table A1  Panel OLS estimates 
 
Variables  1995–2006 1980–1994 1995–2006 1995–2006 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant  -1.02 (.74)  0.59 (1.06)  -0.91 (.52)  -0.59 (.60) 
Fcast errors  -0.01 (.03)  -0.35 (.17)**  0.002 (.03)  0.003 (.03) 
MP Stance  0.05 (.19)  0.01 (.14)  0.03 (.04)  0.04 (.17) 
CBI  0.80 (1.54)  1.42 (2.55)  0.001 (.05)  -0.23 (1.33) 
Interaction  -0.05 (.35)  -0.40 (.31)  -0.01 (.05)  -0.005 (.05) 
Distance  -0.004 (.35)  0.76 (.46)+  -0.01 (.05)  -0.03 (.24) 
Fixed Effects  7.56 (.00)  7.79 (.00)  7.70 (.00)  7.97 (.00) 
Obs.  147 284 242 147 
2 R   0.60 0.69 0.69 0.69 
 
Note: The Fixed effects test is for the Null that both cross-section and time-specific fixed 
effects are jointly insignificant (Separate testing of cross-section versus time-specific 
fixed effects did not alter any of the conclusions shown). The F-statistic is given with  
p-values in parenthesis. The explanatory variables are defined in the text. The 
‘Interaction’ term refers to the product of the ‘MP Stance’ variable and the proxy for CBI. 
Proxies used for CBI in the results reported above are (columns number): (1), (2) 
Cukierman-Siklos; (3), Dincer-Eichengreen; (4) GMT; (6). Fcast errors for the 1980–
1998 and 1980–2006 are based on WEO forecasts for inflation; for the 1990–2006, 1999–
2006 based on Economist forecasts. MP Stance is proxied according to equation (3.6) in 
all columns except column (5) where the money gap is used. The panel is unbalanced. * 
signifies statistically significant at the 1%, ** 5%, + 10% level. Heteroskedastic robust 









 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Fcast errors  -0.67 
(.27) 
-0.01 (.04)  -0.04 (.03)*  0.11 (.09) 
MP Stance  -0.07 
(.34)* 
0.44 (.21)**  0.61 (.22)*  0.30 (.39) 
CBI -2.50 
(3.85) 
1.50 (1.85)  0.11 (.08)  -0.84 (1.01) 
Interaction 0.13 
(.83) 
-0.57 (39)  -0.12 (.06)*  -0.19 (.55) 
Distance 0.04 
(.51) 
-0.12 (.04)*  -0.05 (.02)*  -0.15 (12) 
Obs. 263  147  147  105 
Intercepts Coeff. 
(s.e.)  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff.  s.e. Coeff.  s.e. 
Australia 4.53 
(1.18)* 
-0.49 0.70  -1.1.6  0.87  -1.28 1.40 
Austria 1.77 
(2.59) 
-1.18 1.12  -0.60  .34+  NA  
Belgium 0.78 
(1.49) 
-0.80 .42+  -0.71  .27+  NA  
Canada 2.95 
(2.29) 
-1.07 .79  -6.44  .85+ -0.65 .90 
Denmark 2.78 
(1.81) 
-0.94 .79  -0.66  .44  0.13 .64 
Finland 3.59 
(2.07)+ 
-2.39 .71*  -2.67  .99+  NA  
France 3.41 
(1.59)** 
-1.24 .56  -1.29  .48*  NA  
Germany 2.97 
(2.91 
-1.57 1.32  -1.40  .96  NA  
Ireland 7.18 
(3.19)* 
-0.91 .97  -1.01  .84  NA  
Italy 10.24 
(1.98)* 
0.53 .67  0.45  .66  NA  
Japan -1.06 
(1.83) 
-2.83 .74*  -3.18  .82*  -2.49 .81* 
Netherlands 0.05 
(1.96) 





-1.21 1.49  -1.18  1.18  -1.84 1.55 
Norway 4.09 
(1.69)* 
-0.91 .36*  -1.23  .63  -0.83 1.05 
Portugal 24.55 
(5.71)* 
0.48 1.62  1.39  1.09  NA  
Spain 7.33 
(1.64)* 
-0.003 1.50  0.35  .73  NA  
Sweden 7.97 
(1.75)* 
-2.19 1.15  -2.20  1.02* -2.57 1.51* 
Switzerland 1.08 
(2.16) 







-0.47 1.28  -0.41  1.30  -0.66 1.30 
Euro area  NA  NA    NA    0.34  .81 
 
Note: See notes to Table 4.2. GMM (Arellano-Bond 2 step estimator) uses lags of the 
regressors as well as the voice and accountability, political stability, and quality of 
government indicators from the World Bank governance indicators dataset, the exchange 
rate indicators from Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, and a dummy variable for the number 
of years a country has adopted an explicit inflation target, where applicable. A fixed 
bandwith (Newey-West), Bartlett kernel, heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors. NA 
means not applicable. The panel is unbalanced. In columns (6) and (7) an interaction term 
(Stance*CBI) is also added but all the coefficients were statistically insignificant, even at 
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